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violent retaliation by the winner usually prevents a loser
from enforcing his statutory right. The creditor of the
loser feels no such restraint and, having only an affirmative
selfish interest, is more likely to press a recovery. It is
true that in most instances the creditor will not attempt
to recover from the winner unless his debtor-loser is in-
solvent, yet every recovery serves the public policy against
gambling, and also allows the particular creditor to have
his claim satisfied.
RIGHTS OF HOLDER OF POSSIBILITY OF REVERTOR
AND OWNER OF DETERMINABLE FEE TO IN.
SURANCE PROCEEDS FROM POLICY PRO.
CURED BY THE LATTER
Board of Education v. Winding Gulf Collieries1
Allemannia Fire Insurance Company filed a bill of in-
terpleader on behalf of itself and other insurance com-
panies in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia to determine the proper recipient
of the proceeds of blanket insurance policies. Fire had
destroyed a building on which these companies carried the
risk and the obligation to pay the rightful claimant was
acknowledged. Contestants for the proceeds were The
Board of Education of the County of Raleigh, West Vir-
ginia, (hereinafter called the Board) and Winding Gulf
Collieries, a body corporate, (hereinafter called the Col-
lieries). The bases of the Board's claim were that it had
caused the property in question to be insured, that the
policies covered only its interest therein and that it had
paid all the insurance premiums. The Collieries' claim
was grounded on the facts that it had a possibility of re-
vertor in the property' and that the determinable estate
of the Board had ended when the building was destroyed
by fire. The Collieries asserted that its interest was pro-
tected under the insurance policies and that it should
1 152 F. 2d 382 (C. C. A. 4th, 1945); cert. den. 328 U. S. 844, 90 L. ed.
943, 66 S. Ct. 1023 (1946).
2 In the deed by which the Board took title the following provision ap-
peared after the granting clause: ". . . It is further distinctly understood
and agreed ... that the property hereby conveyed is for public free school
purposes only and for no other purpose or purposes... and that whenever
the said property hereby conveyed shall cease to be used for public free
school purposes, the same and every part hereof shall thereupon ipso facto
revert to and become reinvested in the said party of the first part, its suc-
cessors or assigns in fee simple, with like force and effect as if this con-
veyance had never been made."
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receive the proceeds since they represented the building
which would have passed in fee to the Collieries upon the
termination of the preceding estate. In the insurance con-
tracts the insured was denominated "The Board of Educa-
tion of the County of Raleigh, as is now or may hereafter
be constituted, for account of whom it may concern". The
bill of interpleader was filed on a stipulation of facts after
both the Collieries and the Board had asserted their respec-
tive rights to the entire proceeds. An award in favor of the
Collieries in the District Court' was reversed upon appeal.
Rights to insurance proceeds of a holder of a possi-
bility of revertor and the owner of a determinable fee were
litigated in only one previous reported case, Hawes v.
Lathrop.' Unfortunately, its particular facts limit the
significance of that decision. In that case the plaintiff
gave to the defendants a deed of trust of a tract of land and
improvements for the purpose of establishing a school
thereon. The deed provided that if defendants' plan for
the school should prove unsuccessful, defendants should so
declare by resolution, whereupon title would revert to the
plaintiff. The defendant trustees made an addition to the
building, insured it in their own names, and collected the
proceeds when it was destroyed by fire. Subsequently the
trustees passed the resolution that the general plan for
the school had proved unsuccessful. Plaintiff objected to
the trustees' returning the proceeds to the contributors to
the school fund, donors of unqualified gifts of money, and
claimed that his equitable right to the proceeds in place of
the building was superior to anyone's else. Observing
that the trustees had no further duties and that the donors
had no equity in the fund, the Court found the plaintiff to
have the only plausible claim. The opinion in Board of
Education v. Winding Gulf Collieries disposed of Hawes v.
-Lathrop in this manner:
"'The distinction between these circumstances and
those in the instant case are manifest. Here the school
continued to exist and it was obviously the duty of
the Board of Education to use the insurance money to
maintain it for the county. In any event, we are un-
able to follow the decision of the California court inso-
far as it may be thought to differ from the views here-
in expressed'."
5
sAllemannia Fire Ins. Co. v. Winding Gulf Collieries, 60 F. Supp. 65
(S. D. W. Va., 1945).
'38 Cal. 493 (1869).
152 F. 2d 382, 386.
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Since the case above is apparently the only one in point
on the particular question in the main case, comparisons
will be made to decisions involving analogous issues. One
possible analogy to the present problem is provided by
condemnation suits wherein the condemning authority
seeks to make proper compensation for taking land in
which one person holds a possibility of revertor and an-
other a determinable fee. At least one such case6 has held
that because the land condemned could no longer be used
for the designated purpose, the primary estate had ended,
and the owner of the revertor received the total award.
This is the view most favorable to the Collieries, but the
great majority of cases oppose it. Courts have far more
frequently employed either the theory of impossibility
of performance (i.e. impossibility of using the premises in
the prescribed manner) or the theory that the possibility
of revertor is of uncertain and insignificant value in giving
the owner of the determinable fee the entire award.7 The
Restatement of the Law of Property would allow the con-
tingent owner a partial recovery if the contingency is of
probable occurrence and if the holder of the possibility of
revertor can show that the significant event will probably
occur within a reasonable short period of time.' Had the
land on which the schoolhouse in the instant case stood
been condemned prior to the date of the fire, the rule of the
Restatement would seem to favor giving the entire award
to the Board9 provided that (aside from the prospect of
condemnation) there was little probability of the Board's
abandoning the premises within a reasonably short period
of time.
A second type of case that is similar to the one under
consideration occurs when life tenants and remaindermen
litigate their rights to insurance proceeds from policies
which the life tenants have procured. There is general
harmony in the decisions that when the life tenant takes
out a policy under which a valid claim is later made, some
portion of the proceeds will be allotted to the remainder-
man if any one of the three following conditions exists:
e Lancaster School District v. Lancaster County, 295 Pa. 112, 144 A. 901
(1929). The reasoning of the District Court in Allemannia Fire Ins. Co.
v. Winding Gulf Collieries, 8pra. n. 3, is similar to .the rationale of the
cited case.
7 For a fuller discussion see Comment, Future Intterets-Effect of
Eminent Domain Proceedings (1936) 34 Mich. L. R. 530 and cases cited
therein.
8 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, (1936), See. 53.
0 Ibid. See especially Comment c and Illustration 2.
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1) an agreement on the part of the life tenant to insure
for the benefit of the remainderman, 10 2) a fiduciary rela-
tionship between life tenant and remainderman," or 3) an
express or inferable intent of the life tenant in procuring
the insurance to protect both interests.12
If none of these special conditions is present and the
life tenant insures in his own name and for his own sole
benefit, the legal consequences will be determined accord-
ing to one of three conflicting rules. These three doctrines
are succinctly set forth in Clark v. Leverett.13 The first, or
majority rule, is that the life tenant is not required to use
the proceeds in rebuilding nor is he in any wise accountable
to the remainderman for money so received even though
they are in excess of the value of his interest or equal to
the whole value of the property. 4 The Restatement adopts
this view.", According to the second rule the life tenant
may recover under the policy which he took out for his
own benefit, but if he receive proceeds in excess of the
value of his interest, he shall be regarded as trustee for the
remainderman for such excess. 6 The third view is that,
regardless of the amount of the insurance or the intent of
the insured, the proceeds stand in place of the building and
must either be used to restore the property destroyed or
invested as corpus for the remainderman; the life tenant
may take only the interest therefrom. 7 It appears that
the theory on which this third class of decisions rests is
that a life tenant must be considered generally as a trustee
for the remainderman.5 In the instant case the Court ex-
plicitly refused to adopt the third rule and extend it to in-
clude fees subject to special limitations. On the other hand,
it quoted with approval from cases which expound the
majority rule.19
10 Convis v. Citizens Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Mich. 616, 86 N. W. 994
(1901).
"I Clark v. Leverett, 159 Ga. 487, 126 S. E. 258, 37 A. L. R. 180 (1924).
2 Welsh v. London Assur. Corp., 151 Pa. St. 607, 25 A. 142 (1892).
18 Supra, n. 11. See also 17 R. C. L. p. 642, 33 Am. Jur. pp. 837-840, and
46 C. J. S. pp. 21-2. A full discussion of the subject appears in 126 A. L. R.
336 et 8eq. in annotation to Crisp County Lumber Co. v. Bridges, 187 Ga.
484, 200 S. E. 777 (1939).
" Harrison v. Pepper, 166 Mass. 288, 44 N. E. 222 (1896). Clark v. Lev-
erett terms this the "Massachussetts Rule".
25 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, (1936) Vol. I, See. 123.
" Sampson v. Grogan, 21 R. I. 174, 42 A. 712, 44 L. R. A. 711 (1899).
This result is called the "Rhode Island Rule" in Clark v. Leverett.
17 Green v. Green, 50 S. C. 514, 27 S. E. 952 (1897).
18 So far as has been discovered the Maryland Court of Appeals has not
had occasion to decide the foregoing point.
1 Thompson v. Gearheart, 137 Va. 427, 119 S. E. 67, 35 A. L. R. 36 (1923);
Gorman's Estate, 321 Pa. St. 292, 184 A. 86 (1936).
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It has been previously stated that one of the three con-
ditions which permit a remainderman to share in the pro-
ceeds from a life tenant's insurance policy is an express
or inferrable intent on the part of the life tenant in pro-
curing the contract to protect both interests. The Collieries
sought to demonstrate an analogous intent on the part of
the Board, an intent clearly inferrable (it asserted) from
the particular terms of the blanket insurance contracts.
It was strongly urged by counsel for the Collieries that
denominating the assured "The Board of Education of the
County of Raleigh, as is now or may hereafter be consti-
tuted, for account of whom it may concern", along with
other language in the policy,20 was a plain indication of the
Board's intention to insure the whole interest when the
policy was written. The significance of the phrase, "for
account of whom it may concern", was at issue. The case
quoted by the Court to show the universally accepted
view was Hagan v. Scottish Union & National Ins. Co.21
Since Hooper v. Robinson22 expressed the same doctrine
and since it originated in the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, it is used here for exposition
of the rule. Therein it was held that a contract of insur-
ance may be effected by a person acting as agent for an
undisclosed principal by insuring the agent for account of
whom it may concern. In such event the proceeds
"... will be applied to the interest of the persons
for whom it [the policy] was intended by the person
who ordered it, provided that the latter had the req-
uisite authority from the former or they subsequently
adopted it."'28
It is apparent from this and other cases that the "adop-
tion" may take place at any time after the policy is effected,
even after loss, and it is not at all necessary that the person
procuring the policy have a named individual in mind.24
There is a limitation on the construction of the interest
covered under the phrase in question, which is clearly
go Loss, if any was payable to the Board of Education; it was to "be
deemed the owner of the property herein named . . .and no defect in the
title .to such property shall invalidate this insurance." It was further pro-
vided that if any of the property should be located on lands not owned by
the insured in fee simple, the insurance should not be affected thereby.21186 U. S. 423, 46 L. Ed. 1229, 22 S. Ct. 862 (1902).
2298 U. S. 528, 25 L. ed. 219 (1879).
28 98 U. S. 528, 536-7; 25 L. ed. 219, 220 (1879).
"Hagan v. Scottish Ins. Co., supra n. 21; Fire Ins. Asso. of Eng. v.
Merchants and Miners Trans. Co., 66 Md. 339, 7 A. 905, 59 Am. Rep. 162
(1887) ; CoucH, ENcyc. op INs. LAW, p. 472.
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stated in the early Maryland case, Newson v. Douglass.25
The Court therein said:
"But if.. . [he who acted] did not give the order
for the insurance with reference to the interest of
Newson's representatives, but intended it for his own
benefit and not theirs, then the plaintiff is not entitled
to recover. For no one can, by subsequent adoption,
avail himself of such a policy, who was not at the
time in the contemplation of the party procuring the
insurance, and for whose benefit it was not intended,
notwithstanding any interest he may have had in the
thing insured. The policy not being effected with
reference to his interest, his interest was not insured,
and he of course not concerned in the transaction. ' '26
It is plain, therefore, that in the instant case nothing at
all is inferrable about the intent of the Board of Education
from the mere fact that the words, "for account of whom
it may concern", were used; these words only invite inspec-
tion of the facts to determine the animus of the named
assured in procuring the policy. The Court said in that
regard:
"There was and could have been no intention on
the part of the Board of Education to protect the Col-
lieries when it insured the school building in question.
It was acting to safeguard the public interest so that in
case of the loss of the building means to rebuild it
would be available. The phrase, 'for account of whom
it may concern', was doubtless used in the policy to
make doubly certain that in case of loss the proceeds
of insurance would be payable to the public authorities
charged with the maintenance of the schools, whoever
they might be and by whatever name they might then
be known."2
The Court evidently felt that none of the other language
in the contract indicated anything to the contrary.
A possible difference exists between the Federal and
the Maryland courts in ruling on what evidence is admissi-
ble to show the intent of the named assured in taking out
the insurance. In Newson v. Douglass" certain letters from
one claimant to the individual who actually made the con-
25 7 H. & J. 417 (1826).26 Ibid, pp. 452-3.
"7 P. 386.
2a Supra n. 25.
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tract with the insurance underwriters were ruled admissi-
ble for determining their composer's intent in procuring
the insurance. The more recent Fire Ins. Asso. v. The
Merchants and Miners supports the earlier ruling :29
"But such policies [meaning those written 'for ac-
count of whom it may concern'] are daily issued,...
and it has become elementary law in regard to them,
that extrinsic evidence may be adduced to show who
was in fact the party concerned...".
New Orleans & So. American S.S. Co. v. W. R. Grace &
Co.,80 a Federal case, contains a dictum that statements
of the person who secures the policy are not admissible,
that intent should rather be deduced from the language
of the policy read in the light of existing circumstances.
But Lowery v. Conn. Fire Ins. Co.,8 heard in a Federal
District Court, subsequently held that statements of the
party who caused the words to be inserted would be admis-
sible as evidence of his intent in so doing. In the present
case intent was discovered only by language and circum-
stances, but there was no ruling on the point; issues were
presented on a stipulation of facts and the question of
extrinsic evidence as to intent did not arise.
The Court in Board of Education v. Winding Gulf Col-
lieries achieved a result more consonant with the mandates
of justice than would have attended a contrary determina-
tion. The decision is sound in the fields of insurance and of
property law. Rejection of the holding of Hawes v.
Lathrop2 rather than showing disagreement with previous
authority was an excellent example of putting aside a
superficially similar case to follow the basic pattern of the
common law.
9 66 Md. 339, 348, 7 A. 905, 908, 59 Am. Rep. 162, 165 (1887).
80 26 F. 2d 967, (C. C. A. 2nd 1928).
"l 5 F. Supp. 325, 329 (E. D. N. Y., 1933) ; reversed on other grounds, 70
F. 2d 324, (C. C. A. 2nd, 1934).
33 Supra n. 4.
